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Abstract
As control systems are becoming more complex and capable with much functionality, it requires more eorts
not only to maintain correct operations but also to protect them from various threats. Security of the control
network which connects entities in the system and serves as a path for information transfer between them
is a major cause of concern. Operators of the control systems have taken a conservative way to provide a
protection to the network where it is simply isolated from other systems and networks that could introduce
access channels. Even though the isolation provides a great protection, it limits management eciency
and expandability of the system. Solving the problem of providing interconnectivity as well as sucient
protection to the control network is not trivial.
Existing work proposed a solution where they applied a multi-tier web server system to the control
system in the eort to provide better connectivity and introduced a concept of redundant authentication
to mitigate risks to the system. In this architecture, a front end system that accepts requests from users
is required to provide a non-repudiable credential of the requesting user when it passes the request to a
back end proxy that has access privilege on the control system. This limits malicious actions that could be
performed by the compromised front end system. It, however, forces every recently authenticated user to
share the vulnerability in the case of the compromised front end system due to a requirement that clients
should remain unmodied.
In this thesis, we suggest a new solution with a client program to overcome the above limitation and
provide a better protection. Installation of the client program is required in order to access the control system
from the outside network. With this architecture, users who have chosen to opt out by not installing the
client program are safe from the risk introduced by other users who have chosen to install the program and
use the service. Non-repudiable credentials are still required with every request to the control system hence
containing the possible actions of the compromised front end system on the control system. We validate our
strategy on Building Automation System (BAS) testbed with a practical application which allows users to
unlock doors of the building.
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Networked computers are widely used for large control systems which manage and regu-
late physical processes. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems that
control and monitor processes like electrical power transmission and distribution are one
example and Industrial Control Systems (ICS) which monitor manufacturing and produc-
tion processes in a factory are another. Security and reliability of these networked computer
control systems are highly important due to the value of the resources that the systems
control and possible disastrous consequences of their malfunction. For example, 2003 black-
out which occurred throughout parts of Northeastern and Midwestern United States and
Ontario, Canada illustrates possible damages on the society when the security is compro-
mised [1].
A common way to provide protection to such systems is by isolating the control system
network which connects entities in the system and serves as a path for information transfer
between them from other less secure public networks including the Internet. This isolation,
often called an air gap, provides the protection by limiting access to the control network.
Only authorized operators with physical access to the system have access to the control sys-
tem network. Therefore, it requires human operators to present at the physical location and
manually manage the control system making the task inconvenient and inecient. Opera-
tors often make compromises to perform their job more conveniently and eciently. Typical
compromises are remote management by Virtual Private Network (VPN) connection to the
control systems and multi-homed systems that connect to both the control and the public
networks. Above compromises, however, introduce new vulnerabilities to the system and if
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used without care, they can be used as means to compromised the whole system. Since VPN
connections have known vulnerabilities [13, 18], the operators must address them before they
use VPN. Also, multi-homed management console has access channels from outside networks
which broaden attack surface to the control system. Compromised VPN and multi-homed
management console can undermine the security of the control system and may lead to
devastating results.
In addition to making the control system management inconvenient and inecient, the
isolation prevents support for various applications. In case of Building Automation System
(BAS) which controls the functions of a building including door locks, video surveillance,
and the Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning (HVAC), the isolation limits useful ap-
plications. For example, temperature control using web service, unlocking doors through
web pages and granting access to rooms without manual conguration of the control sys-
tems. Therefore, it is desirable to provide a dierent security mechanism that can provide
convenience and support for applications as well as a great protection to the control systems.
Figure 1.1: The Siebel Center for Computer Science at the University of Illinois
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Figure 1.2: Temperature Controller
To illustrate the above state in more detail, we present a case study of one example of the
networked computers control systems. The Siebel Center, Computer Science Department
building at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, is an example of BAS. Figure 1.1
shows the outside look of the building. It is a 225,000 square foot building that was built in
2004. The Siebel Center uses Andover Continuum from Advanced Control Corporation for
its BAS management. As described above, the control system of the Siebel Center manages
and regulates various functions in the building. These functions include HVAC system, door
lock system, and surveillance system. Figure 1.2 shows a temperature controller on a wall.
This device enables users to manually set temperature of a room. This controller enables
users to manually set temperature of a room. The operator of the building has privilege to set
high and low limits on the controller so that the users cannot intentionally or unintentionally
set the temperature to an inappropriate degree. The Siebel Center uses swipe cards to open
doors to rooms as shown in gure 1.3. When the card is swiped, information on the card
is sent to the control system to verify whether it has privilege to open the door. To add
a new access privilege or to remove access privilege, the operator must make the change
3
Figure 1.3: Swipe Card and Door Lock Figure 1.4: Digital Security Camera
to the management system manually. Moreover, since requests for these changes usually
come through enterprise network or the Internet, the operator must transfer the data to the
control system manually. Therefore, it is onerous for the operators if a lot of changes occur.
Another important feature of BAS is video surveillance with security cameras. The Siebel
center has several digital security cameras at strategic locations covering building exits and
hallways. Figure 1.4 shows one of them. Although they are not always monitored by human,
audit records can be used in case of theft.
Even though the Siebel Center already has many functions, some interesting and useful
functions are not possible due to the isolation of the control network. A software doorbell
function could be one example. Since there is no physical doorbell for each room in Siebel
Center, a person without access privilege to the room must knock on the door until someone
comes out. It becomes a problem when the room is big and the door is far from where people
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stay. If there were connection between the building control network and the Internet, we
can think of a smart phone application or a web site which allows a user to input a room
number. It can then connect to the control system and nds out people who recently swiped
into the room and send some type of alerts to answer the door. Another example is opening
doors through web services or smart phone applications. Surprisingly many people forget
to take their cards when leaving the room and could not get in. Sometimes people leave
their cards at home. It is very useful to have the door opening web service or application
in these situations. The application can allow people to enter a door name with some
type of identication and then send that information to the control system for verication
using the connection between the control network and the Internet. The control system
will open the door after the verication. (An advanced example of such an application is
the Grey authorization system [6, 7].) However, these new functions that are possible from
the interconnectivity must not jeopardize the security of the control system. Vulnerabilities
introduced by the connection to the outside networks have to be addressed beforehand.
Multi-tier client-server system which is widely used in e-commerce and enterprise infor-
mation applications can be applied to the control systems in order to provide the convenience
and the support for useful applications. But simply applying the multi-tier system to the
control system may introduce new vulnerabilities. Existing work [8] suggested a way to im-
prove security in applying the multi-tier systems. Their architecture consists of three tiers
and functionality is distributed among them. Higher tier or front end accepts connections
from clients and middle tier acts as a proxy and connects the higher tier to lower tier or back
end. The control system itself is the lower tier. Their system enforces the principle of least
privilege on the higher tier such that the higher tier can only access the lower tier's functions
and data that are required for its mission. This is achieved by demanding a non-repudiable
credential of a client at the middle tier. The client rst authenticates to the front end and
redundantly authenticates itself to a special proxy which provides the non-repudiable creden-
tial to the front end. The front end sends the request from the client with the non-repudiable
credential to the middle tier. The middle tier or the proxy only passes the request from the
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front end to the back end when it comes with the non-repudiable credential of the requesting
client. The principle of least privilege is enforced since the higher tier's actions are limited
by the non-repudiable credential, whereas higher tier in normal multi-tier system usually
has unlimited access. Their approach, therefore, contains possible malicious actions of the
higher tier if it is compromised.
Even though this strategy achieves the goal of providing certain level of protection in
providing the interconnectivity to the control system, it forces every recently authenticated
user in the system to share the vulnerability introduced by the new architecture. This inherits
from a requirement that the client should remain unchanged. Because of the requirement,
their architecture relies on a special proxy to generate the non-repudiable credentials that
are not tied with every request. Instead, the credential is tied with each client and could be
used with any requests from the same client until it is expired. Therefore, if the higher tier
gets compromised, it can use the unexpired credentials from the recently authenticated users
to send bogus requests to the middle tier pretending them to be coming from the legitimate
clients.
In this thesis, we introduce a new architecture that provides more protection with the
help of a client program. Users who want to use the new system must install the client
program. Those users who decide not to install the program cannot use the system but they
are not exposed to new vulnerabilities introduced to the users who have chosen to install
the program and use the system. Our new system also requires a non-repudiable credential
with every access of the higher tier to the lower tier to limit the possible actions. In our
architecture, however, the client program provides the non-repudiable credential and it is
tightly tied with every request. Therefore, it is not possible for the compromised higher tier
to use the credentials to create new fake requests. The most it can do is to reuse recently
executed requests which are probably not very useful.
We applied our strategy to our BAS test bed for validation. In particular, we implemented
an application which allows users to send an unlock door request to a higher tier application
server which serves as a front end to the BAS control networks. A middle tier gateway
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proxy enforces least privilege by requiring the non-repudiable credential with the request
from the higher tier application server. The client program uses public key cryptography
digital signature to sign the request and to provide the non-repudiable credential. The
middle tier gateway proxy rst veries the credential and passes the request to the control
system or rejects the request depending on the verication status. We were able to open a
door using our application.
This thesis consists of 6 chapters. Next Chapter explains backgrounds and related works.
In Chapter 3, we introduce our new strategy by describing the architectural design of the
system. Chapter 4 discusses the application, its requirements and threat model. In Chap-
ter 5, we describe the actual implementation of the system. We then analyze our strategy




In this Chapter, we will rst describe general architecture of Building Automation System
(BAS) and then give some background on current BAS vendors, capabilities, and standards.
Next, we will briey talk about ways to control access to a network from potentially vulner-
able or malicious computers and eorts to apply them to the control networks. Lastly, we
will explain the work by Boyer et al. [8] in more detail since it is closely related to this work.
2.1 General architecture of BAS
Figure 2.1: Typical Building Control System
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BAS is an example of the networked computers control systems that manages function-
alities of a building. These functionalities include lighting control, HVAC system, door
lock/unlock management, and alarm system. Since compromise of these functionalities can
bring severe damages including unlocking of doors and turning o the alarm system, the
building control network is usually isolated from other networks. Figure 2.1 shows a gen-
eral architecture of the building control system. Building control network is separated from
enterprise network and the Internet. A control console machine which has applications to
manage the building functionalities is attached to the control network. Control database
contains information regarding who has access to which rooms and current temperature set-
tings of each room. The enterprise network connects computers used by people who work in
the building and provides access to the Internet with some protection measure like rewall.
A building operator's job is to monitor and control the BAS and keep the database up to
date.
Even though this isolation of the control network provides a great protection, it makes
the operators to conduct their job manually because they need to use the specic control
console. For instance, when there is a request to adjust temperature of the building or to
grant an access to a room to someone, the operator must sit on the control console to make
the change. These requests usually come to the operator via e-mail or some kind of web
request services. However, this architecture does not allow them to be processed eciently
and automatically since the control network is isolated. In this thesis, we suggest a new
architecture that not only alleviates the burden on building control system management due
to the isolation of the control network but also eectively mitigates risks to the architecture.
2.2 Background on BAS vendors, capabilities, and standards
Some of the major BAS vendors are: Siemens Building Technologies, Honeywell Building
Control Systems, Johnson Controls, and Schneider Electric, formerly TAC. Recently, big
companies like IBM Corporation and Cisco Systems, Inc. also joined the BAS industry.
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They all provide some kind of building management systems that allow the operators to have
more control and easier access to all building systems. Capabilities of these solutions seem
to include secure, extensible, and open systems. However, looking at them closely reveals
that those approaches are primitive. For example, some seems to oer SSL connections to
the control networks but limiting the use to the operators where others oer web access but
without open API. Although some vendors are working on more programmable and better
networked systems, most of the vendors are more concerned on the security and reliability
of BAS. Therefore, current BAS solutions take a conservative state and building owners and
the operators seem to accept it.
BACnet, LonTalk, Modbus, oBIX, and OLE for Process Control (OPC) are main industry
standards and communications protocols for BAS. Solutions from some vendors have support
for multiple protocols. For example, APOGEE Building Automation solution from Siemens
natively support BACnet but it also provide integration options for OPC, Modbus, and
LonTalk. Proprietary protocols are also used by others. Now let us look at some of these
protocols more closely.
BACnet is one of the main standard protocols. The development of BACnet began in 1987
by American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE).
It became ASHRAE and American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Standard in 1995. It
was also standardized by ISO in 2003. The BACnet protocol species both how to represent
data on the network and the services that are used to transfer data from one BACnet node
to another. BACnet denes all data on the network in terms of \objects", \properties", and
\services". Objects represent physical inputs, outputs, and logical grouping of points that
perform some function. These objects have prescribed properties and they are monitored
and controlled through these properties. The BAS uses dened services to access a property
of an object or to request an action from an object [2].
LonTalk is another major standard protocol used in BAS besides BACnet. It was devel-
oped by a company called Echelon Corporation and accepted as ANSI Standard in 1999.
Subsequently, the communications protocol has been accepted as ISO/IEC global standard,
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European standard, and Chinese standard. The Lontalk protocol implements all seven layers
of the OSI network model. It is implemented with a mixture of hardware and rmware on
a silicon chip. This is to eliminate any possibility of modication to the protocol. At rst,
an Echelon Corporation-designed IC chip was required to implement the LonTalk protocol.
However, the protocol became available for general purpose processors in 1999 [3, 10].
The oBIX (Open Building Information eXchange) standard is web service-based inter-
faces to building control systems. It is an open standard developed around XML to support
web services and service oriented architecture. It enables communications between mechan-
ical and electrical control systems in buildings and enterprise applications. It is developed
and managed by the Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Stan-
dards (OASIS) oBIX Technical Committee. In oBIX, all information and BAS entities are
represented as objects in XML. Each object consists of attributes or valid XML elements.
These valid XML elements also have attributes. Objects are queried and modied using
web services. A distinguishing aspect of oBIX is support for a publish/subscribe service on
objects which allows the objects to be accessed by a dened polling rate in a client-server
based system.
2.3 Basic perimeter protection and their application to the
control systems
A common practice to provide a protection to a network from outside access is to place a
machine at entry points to the network. The machine performs a security control on every
access from the outside. There are various types of this machine. The most common one
is a ltering rewall. It inspects packets coming into the network and decides whether to
allow the packets based on a set of rules. It can also restrict the ports that could not be
used to access the network. Another type is one that serves as an endpoint of VPN. It
uses authentication to deny access to unauthorized users and decrypts packets which were
encrypted to prevent eavesdropping. This machine can also be a proxy server which evaluates
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requests from clients before they reach the actual server. It is similar to the ltering rewall
but rather than ltering at the packet layer, it works at application layer. Therefore, the
proxy server must have detailed knowledge about the applications to evaluate the requests.
There have been eorts to apply these methods on the isolated control networks. For
example, Tono Industrial Security Solution provides rewall protection to the control sys-
tems. Rules can be dened to specify which network devices are allowed to communicate and
what protocols they may use. In March 2006, American Gas Association released a report [5]
on Cryptographic Protection of SCADA Communications. Although the main purpose of
the report is to provide a guideline for voluntary implementation of a comprehensive cyber
security posture, VPN is suggested for encryption and authentication of SCADA commu-
nications. A recent report [11] from Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure
(CPNI) and the Department of Homeland Security recommended good security practices
in supporting remote access to industrial control systems. Among the many guidelines, it
recommends the use of rewalls and VPNs.
2.4 Multi-tier systems and its application to BAS
Figure 2.2: Typical Multi-tier System Architecture
In the eort to provide both interconnectivity and protection to BAS, Boyer et al. [8]
introduced an architecture that employs multi-tier client-server architecture to BAS. Multi-
tier architecture is widely used in e-commerce and enterprise information applications. It
separates service into dierence modules to provide a exibility and reusability. For example,
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an application that allows access to personal bank accounts through the Internet can be
broken into user interface, application process logic, and back end system such as a database.
Each of these modules can be modied without the change of the other and they can be
reused in similar services as well. Figure 2.2 illustrates this architecture. Clients use user
interface such as web browsers to request service to an application server. The application
server, known as a higher tier or a front end, is in charge of authenticating the clients and
determining whether the requests are authorized for the clients. If the requests are legitimate,
the application server forwards the request to the database, a lower tier or a back end. And
the database serves the requests by retrieving or updating the relevant information. In this
architecture, the application server acts as the proxy server described above and provides
the protection to the system behind it. However, if the application server is compromised,
the system behind it is exposed to a serious threat. Because the front end passes requests
to the back end on behalf of many dierent clients, it usually has general access to the
back end. Therefore, the compromised front end can send malicious requests to the back
end pretending them to be coming from legitimate users. The back end does not have
means to identify whether those requests are legitimate or fake. In case of e-commerce, the
compromised application server can retrieve personal information like credit card numbers
and passwords from the database.
Authors have introduced a new architecture that can mitigate the eect of the compro-
mised front end in the multi-tier systems. Figure 2.3 illustrates the architecture on typical
BAS. As we can see from the gure, it has another proxy between the front end application
server and the back end control system. It is called gateway and its job is to enforce the
principle of least privilege on the application server to restrict its access to the back end
control system. In other words, it forces the application server to access only the functions
and data that are necessary to serve the client's request from the back end control system.
Redundant authentication is their mechanism to enforce the principle of least privilege. The
gateway demands proof of authentication with every request from the application server and
restricts the access privileges according to the specied principal. Each user must authenti-
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Figure 2.3: User Accessible Building Automation System with Redundant Authentication
cate themselves to the front end application server and the application server must show the
proof of authentication to the gateway hence it is called the redundant authentication. In
order to prevent the application server from forging the proof, they incorporated enterprise
authentication with a proxy server to provide the proof such a way that the application
server cannot tamper with the proof. Therefore, the compromised application server cannot
request a command like \open all doors" without the proof of the authorized personal. This
signicantly improves the protection to the multi-tier system. In addition, this gateway is
also capable of performing the application layer rewall by enforcing a set of rules on each
application. These rules can be simple as whitelists and blacklist or more complex.
The role of the authentication proof is critical in this architecture. It must be non-
repudiable. In other words, when the application server passes a request with this credential,
it must be able to convince the gateway that it is from the user who made the request. Since
the most enterprise systems do not support non-repudiable credentials, they used another
proxy called authentication proxy to translate the enterprise authentication credentials to
non-repudiable credentials. When a user requests a service to the application server, the
user is also asked to authenticate to the enterprise authentication server. The enterprise
authentication then provides the authentication credential to the authentication proxy which
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creates a non-repudiable credential based on the enterprise credential. The authentication
proxy returns this non-repudiable credential to the application server so that the application
server can send both the request and the credential to the gateway. The gateway limits the
privilege of the application server based on the credential provided.
This architecture shows a way to provide user accessibility to the control systems with
an eective protective mechanism. The authors have validated the architecture by applying
it to the BAS. However, we have found some limitations of the architecture and we suggest
a new architecture that overcomes those limitations and provides an even better protection




One of the limitations of the work by Boyer et al. [8] is that if the application server gets
compromised, all the recently authenticated users are under the risk. A lot of users may
concurrently send requests to the application server and to pass the requests to the gateway,
the application server needs non-repudiable credentials from all those users. The credentials
must go through the application server because there are no other channels to the gateway.
Once an attacker takes over the application server, the attacker can use the credentials that
are not expired and send false requests on behalf of recently authenticated users. Setting the
expiration time short might help since it leaves not much time for the attacker to use those
credentials. However, if it is too short, the users have to authenticate repeatedly causing
inconvenience. Therefore, it is hard to nd the perfect expiration duration. Although their
work provides better protection than a simple multi-tier system where the compromised
application server has full privilege over the back end system, the attacker, in the worst
case, might be able to do almost everything with a combination of various privileges of
dierent users.
In addition, their architecture relies on the enterprise authentication to conduct user
authentication and provide credentials to the authentication proxy for generating non-
repudiable credentials. It implies that the enterprise authentication server and the proxy
must be trusted. Otherwise, the gateway cannot rely on the non-repudiable credentials cre-
ated by those two components. Moreover, they assume that the gateway is trusted as well.
They claim that since the application proxy and the gateway are small, special purpose and
isolated implementations, they can conform to stringent security requirements. Although it
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is generally true, we believe that it is always better to have less number of trusted compo-
nents.
In the eort to overcome above limitations, we introduce a new architecture that pro-
vides better protection to the control systems in the case of the compromised application
server and that allows interconnectivity from outside networks. Consequently, our design
provides convenience to the control system management and support for useful applications
with increased protection. We chose to use client slide program to achieve the above goal.
More specically, we require a client program which serves the purpose of providing the non-
repudiable credentials that were used in the existing work. We still utilize the non-repudiable
credential to enforce the principle of least privilege on the higher tier. However, in our case,
the client program provides this non-repudiable credential instead of the enterprise authen-
tication server and the authentication proxy. Moreover, in our case, this non-repudiable
credential is tightly coupled with not only the user making a request but the request itself.
Therefore, even though the application server passes the credential with the request to the
gateway, the compromised application server cannot use the credential to perform any other
actions than the exact request which the credential is tied to. Consequently, the scope of
possible actions of the compromised application server is greatly reduced from access privi-
leges of recently authenticated users to the recent requests. Moreover, our architecture does
not require the enterprise authentication server and the authentication proxy hence reducing
the number of trusted components of the system.
Our architecture could be applied in almost any multi-tier systems where client are ca-
pable of installing the client side program. To give better understanding of how it could be
applied in real systems, we illustrate our architecture integrated with a typical BAS in Fig-
ure 3.1. As the gure shows, it consists of three tiers. The application server is the top-tier
or the front end, the gateway proxy forms the middle-tier and the legacy BAS controller
and database represents the bottom-tier or the back end. There is only one access channel
from the outside to the building control network which is from the application server to
the gateway proxy. Users use the client program to send requests to the application server
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Figure 3.1: User Accessible Building Automation System with Client Program
over the Internet or enterprise network. As mentioned above, the enterprise authentication
server and the authentication proxy are not needed in our architecture. However, the gate-
way still requires the non-repudiable credential to enforce the principle of least privilege on
the application server. The client program provides this credential using digital signature
scheme. Every request from the application server to the gateway is digitally signed by the
client program. Therefore, it is not possible for the compromised application server to reuse
the credential to make bogus requests, whereas it is the case in the existing work. In fact,
the most the compromised application server can do is to re-send the recent requests before
they expire. They are probably of little use for the attacker since the clients would not send
requests like \open all doors of the building" or \turn all security cameras o." With the
help of the client program we signicantly mitigate the risk to the control system, even more
than the existing work.
We now describe the process in detail. First of all, a user who wants to use the new
service must install the client program which allows the user to connect to the application
server. When the user executes the program, it asks for information that is required to make
a request to the control system. After the information is obtained, the program connects
to the application server and sends the request over the Internet or the enterprise network.
Upon receiving the request, the application server translates the client request to a low level
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query that is understood by the gateway and the control system. This low level query is
then sent back to the client for verication. The client program reads the query and displays
it to the user in a user readable form so that the user can verify that the query is the
exact translation of the request. This is necessary to prevent the compromised application
server from sending a fake query back to the client for a signature and using it to achieve
a malicious goal. For example, when a user asks to open a door to his/her oce, the
compromised application server can change it to open an entrance door and send back to
the user for the signature. If the client program does not show the returned request, the user
will blindly sign the request thinking it will open the oce door but the entrance door will
be opened instead to allow an intruder. After the user veries the query and digitally signs
it to tie the query with the user's non-repudiable credential, the signed query is sent back
to the application server. It then passes the signed query to the gateway. The gateway rst
checks validity of the digital signature and if valid, it checks whether the current request is
authorized to the associated user with its policy. If the signature is valid and the request
is authorized, the gateway executes the query by sending a message to the control system.
Otherwise the gateway rejects the request.
One advantage of our system is that users have a choice to decide whether to use the
service or not. It is important since only those users who chose to use the service share
vulnerability introduced by the interconnectivity. In other words, users who opt out of the
service do not risk anything in the case of the compromised application server or the client
machine. Users can opt out simply by not installing the client program. Compromised
client machine cannot connect and send requests to the application server without the client
program. Moreover, the compromised application server cannot exploit clients who do not
have the program installed. The existing work, however, forces every user to share the
vulnerability introduced by the architecture. This is because one of their requirements
is to keep the client unmodied. We decided to relax the requirement since most client
devices including laptops or cell phones are capable of installing a program. By relaxing
this requirement, we could limit the scope of the risk only to those users who opt in to
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Application and Threat Model
It is important to analyze threats to a new system and describe the threat model. However,
we will rst describe an application that we developed for the implementation of our system
to help better understanding of the threats. After we discuss the threats and the threat
model, we will show how our system eectively mitigates the threats.
Even though our system could be applied to dierent control systems, we focused on the
building automation system for our implementation. The application we developed illus-
trates how the interconnectivity from our design provides eciency to the building manage-
ment and supports useful applications. Our application allows users of the building to unlock
doors for which they have been granted access via a program installed on their machines in-
cluding laptops and smart phones. Normally, they open doors with their identication cards.
If they have been granted a privilege to open the door then they can unlock the door with
their cards. If they do not the privilege, the door stays locked. People sometimes forget to
take their cards with them and thus cannot get in to their oces. In that case, the building
operator or manager either makes a temporary access card for them or use the master card
to open the door for them. This takes away much time from the operator. However, our
application allows the operator to save the time spend on these occasions by allowing the
users to open the doors by themselves. However, it does not allow them to open doors that
they do not already have privilege to open. The access privilege of each user is usually the
same when using our application. But it is also possible to limit the privilege if necessary
with the gateway policy. In addition, we require that every access through the application
to the control system must be audited. It should be analyzed to ensure that there are no
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new security violations to the building system using the new service. It helps us to deal with
new attacks to the control system promptly.
Here is an example scenario which shows why the interconnectivity helps. A user, Alice
comes out of her oce to go to a meeting. After the meeting she nds out that she left
her identication card in the oce. The only way to get in is to get a temporary card from
building operations center because she uses the oce alone. Depending on the busyness of
the center, it might take up to an hour to get the temporary card. However, if she could
use our application, she can go in to her oce less than a minute. All she needs to do is
execute the program to send request to the building control system to open the door to her
oce and wait few seconds. If there were no interconnectivity between the building control
network and the public network, both Alice and the building operator could not have saved
their time.
Because the application provides a direct connection to the building control system, it is
important to consider possible attacks and discuss the countermeasures. The most important
concern in providing the interconnectivity to the building control system is that it may
leave the system vulnerable. In other words, the interconnectivity might be used as a
channel for attacking the control system. In the worst case, attackers might be able to
gain complete control over the building control system. However, it is more likely that
the attackers exploit the application and use it in their favor. In that case, the attackers
could launch attacks like opening doors to the building entrances or critical rooms. These
might lead to physical attacks to the building including stealing of expensive equipment
and les which have sensitive information. Another possible threat is a denial of service
attack. The attackers could launch the denial of service attack on the application server
which accepts connections from users and make the service unavailable. In addition, it
might be possible for the attackers to remove all access privileges from all doors of the
building, rendering the building not accessible. Moreover, if the attackers were able to gain
the control over the building control system, they could manipulate other functionalities of
the building automation system. For example, they could set the temperature of the building
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at a certain degree and disallow any changes, making the building unusable or they could
disable security cameras.
The multi-tier architecture with the enforcement of the principle of least privilege on the
application server would be able to mitigate the threat of the attackers taking complete
control over the building control system. Our system only allows door unlocking requests to
pass through the gateway proxy, hence it is not feasible for the attackers to send commands
like disabling the security cameras or changing the temperature and make them work. Unless
there is a serious bug in the application, it is not possible for the attackers to manipulate
other building functionalities. However, the enforcement of the principle of least privilege
cannot address the threats to the door unlocking system. To mitigate the threats to the door
unlocking system, we use the non-repudiable credentials that ties users with the requests
that they make. This allows the gateway to enforce a policy that rejects unlocking requests
when the user making the request has not been granted access within the BAS to the door on
which they are performing an action. In other words, the gateway checks whether the user
making the request is allowed to unlock the same door physically using their identication
card. This means that our application does not give more access privileges to the users than
they already have. Therefore, the attackers must acquire the non-repudiable credentials of
many dierent users in order to unlock arbitrary doors. Or they must acquire the credentials
of high privilege users to open doors to critical rooms like the building control center. Even
though our architecture do not provide countermeasures for the denial of service attack on the
application server, many existing solutions including ltering based on proling [28, 27, 19],
rate limiting based on Reverse Turing Tests [22, 17], and payment based defenses [21, 30,
24, 16, 29] can be applied to our system.
Our architecture has three main components: the client program, the application server,
and the gateway proxy. Among these components, we assume that the client program and
the application server could be compromised by the attackers but not the gateway proxy.
This is a reasonable assumption because the gateway proxy is a small, special purpose
program which can comply with strict security requirements. In addition, the gateway is
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isolated from the outside networks and the only path is from the application server which
the gateway does not fully trust. However, it is relatively easier to compromise the client
program and the application server since they are exposed to the public networks. Because
of the use of the non-repudiable credentials with every request to the control system in
our architecture, the possible actions that the compromised application server can perform
are very limited. All it can do is to replay the recently used requests until the credentials
expire. Because our application does not give more access privilege to individuals than the
privilege that they already have within the BAS, the compromised client program is only
as powerful as the individual associated with the program. Even though it is dangerous if a
client program of an individual with high access privilege is compromised, the gateway can
enforce an attenuation of privilege policy to reduce the privilege of the individual when using
the application. For example, the policy can specify which doors can be opened using our





Figure 5.1: Building Automation System Test Bed
We implemented a prototype of our system on a building automation system test bed
which is a small scale version of the actual BAS used for the Siebel Center for Computer
Science at the University of Illinois. This prototype implementation shows the practicality
of our design. Figure 5.1 shows the test bed located in Illinois Security Lab. This test bed
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allows us to simulate a building with two doors and up to two areas. Each area could have
more than one door associated with it and people who have access to an area can open
all the doors associated with the area. One door of the test bed has a swipe card reader
and the other door has a proximity card reader. The swipe card reader is shown in the
bottom middle of the gure. This test bed can handle any number of users, although we
have registered four users for our implementation. The test bed is in a stand-alone mode,
meaning that there is only one management console connected to the BAS. The computer on
the left of the gure is the management console and runs the Andover Continuum System.
One limitation of the test bed is that it can only simulate the access control functions of the
Andover Continuum System, but this is enough for our prototype implementation.
Figure 5.2: Prototype Implementation
The overview of our implementation of the application discussed in the previous chapter
is illustrated in Figure 5.2. This shows the implementation choices we made to satisfy the
requirements of Chapter 4. A user who wants to open a door using our application uses the
client program to make a TCP connection to the application server. After the connection
is made, the client program sends a request to open a door with the user id and the door
name. The details of the client program and the communication process between the client
program and the application server is described in Section 5.1. The application server forms
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a command based on the information received from the client and sends it back to the
client for a digital signature. The user must verify the command from the application server
before signing it. After the command has been signed, the application server passes it to
the gateway with a low-level oBIX query that the gateway understands using a dedicated
communication line. The application server and how it utilizes the oBIX to communicate
with the gateway is described in Section 5.2.
The gateway proxy, described in Section 5.3, is a trusted entity that enforces the principle
of least privilege on every request to the building control system. It is also capable of
enforcing its own access control policy independent from the building control system policy.
The policy data such as a black list and access control lists are stored in a database located
within the building control network, and can be queried using standard SQL. The gateway
rst checks the integrity of the command using the digital signature scheme and veries
whether the command satises its policy. After the verication, the command is translated
into the OPC standard and sent to the Andover Continuum NetController which send an
unlock command to the appropriate door.
5.1 Client Program
The Client program is a critical component of our application. First of all, it is not possible
to use the application without the client program. This gives users a choice on whether to
use the application or not. If the client program or the application server gets compromised,
those who use the application might be at risk. However, those who do not have the client
program are not exposed to the risk. In addition, it provides the non-repudiation proof to
the gateway via digital signature. This is required to enforce access control on every request
to the gateway.
This client program is currently written as Windows Forms Application in C# language.
Figure 5.3 shows an initial user interface form that appears when the client program starts.
On the left, it has two input boxes for a user ID and a door name. The user must ll them
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Figure 5.3: Client Program User Interface
before clicking the unlock button below to connect to the application server. Upon clicking
the unlock button, the client program creates TCP connection to the application server and
sends the user ID and the door name entered in the input boxes. After the connection is
made, the unlock button is disabled to prevent another connection. Status window on the
right side displays important messages about actions performed by the client program. For
instance, \Server Connected" message is displayed when the connection to the application
server is made successfully. Also, if an error occurs, an error message is displayed.
Figure 5.4: Client Program Signing Window
The application server creates a temporary le and writes the information received from
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the client program. It also writes the current time to calculate the expiration time of the
request. This le is then sent back to the client. The client program displays the contents
of the le on a new window. This window is shown in Figure 5.4. As shown in the gure,
user ID, room number (or door name), and the authentication time are displayed. If the
information is correct, user clicks the sign button on the left. The client program then
digitally signs the command with the private key of the user and sends the digital signature
attached command to the application server. It waits for a response from the application
server. If everything goes well, the door will be unlocked with a success message box and if
not, a failure message box will be displayed. If the information shown is dierent from what
the user entered in the previous window, the user can cancel the process by clicking a cancel
button on the right.
The gateway must maintain trustworthy copies of the public keys of all users who use the
application in order to verify the signatures. One way is to use a trusted third party certicate
authority to issue digital certicates. However, this method must allow the gateway to have a
channel to the third party certicate authority. This channel must be secured and dedicated
otherwise it could be used by attackers to gain access to the gateway to compromise it.
Alternatively, the building operator can create and issue a special key pair to each user only
to be used for this application. The operator can issue the key pair physically on a digital
medium like a ash drive when users rst register and get their identication card. This
method is relatively safer than using the certicate authority since there is no additional
outside connection to the gateway proxy. Also, it is easier for the operator and the user to
revoke the key pair. They can simply discard the key pair because it is independent from
other uses.
5.2 Application Server
The main role of the application server is to accept connections from multiple clients and pass
the requests to the gateway proxy. It is basically a multi-threaded web server implemented
29
in C# that accepts TCP connections on a special port for the application. It listens on this
port for incoming connection requests and when the request comes from a client it creates
a new TCP connection and a client state to store information about the client. It is a
temporary state which is maintained until the application terminates. With the information
the application server produces a command which will be sent to the gateway after signed
by the client and writes the command in a temporary le. The application server then sends
the le to the client for verication of the contents of the le and for the digital signature
on the command. After the client returns the signed command, it passes the command to
the gateway proxy using the oBIX XML language.
The oBIX provides an XML-based interface for operating mechanical and electrical control
systems in buildings [12]. Recently, the purpose of oBIX has been generalized to include any
type of embedded software systems. General object model and a set of operations on these
objects are dened in the specication. Although any kind of objects can be represented
with this model, we decided to use our own XML specications that are more appropriate
for objects of our application including users and non-repudiable credentials. In oBIX, every
objects are referenced using a unique URI and accessed with the read or write operations.
More complex commands than a read or write could use the invoke operation. The doors
in our prototype implementation have URI for reference and each door has two sub-objects
called unlock and open. The unlock sub-object tells whether the door is unlocked and the
open sub-object shows whether the door is opened. When clients send a request to open
a door, the application server sends write operation to the unlock sub-object of the door
object. The open sub-object is read only since our application does not require the write
operation on it. However, it is possible to design the system in a dierent way since these
are simply a design decision we have made. In addition to the above objects, we also have
an area object that is associated with door objects. An area can have more than one door
assigned to it. In this way, we can have an access control list for each area instead of keeping
it for every door. It is more convenient if an area has more than one door. Therefore, every
request to unlock a door is checked against the access control list of the area associated with
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the door. These area objects only allow the read operation since the application does not
need to modify the access control list.
Using the oBIX XML language described above, the application server sends requests
from users to the gateway. It also passes the non-repudiable credential which is a signed
command of what the user has requested. It uses a dedicated line and UDP connection to
communicate with the gateway. It also utilizes the Web Service Security [20] to secure the
communication.
5.3 Gateway
The gateway is responsible for performing access control on requests from the application
server. It is also written in C#. When a request comes from the application server, it rst
checks the integrity of the command by verifying the signature. We assume that the gateway
already has the public key of the client for the verication. We discussed possible ways to
acquire the public keys in Section 5.1. Unlike the other two components, we consider the
gateway as a trusted component. Therefore, we assume that the gateway will perform the
verication honestly. It is also the last line of defense against attacks to the building control
system. If it cannot verify the signature, then it simply rejects the request by sending an
error message to the application server which will pass that to the client program. Once the
signature is veried, the gateway retrieves information from the request. It includes the user
ID, the door name, and the authentication time. The authentication time is used to nd out
how fresh the request is. The gateway proceeds only when the request is made less than the
congured expiration time. This expiration duration could be congured to allow longer or
shorter window. Currently, it is set to ve minutes for our prototype implementation. Next,
the user ID is checked against the gateway policy. We implemented a white list and a black
list for the user ID. The user ID must be in the white list and must not be in the black list.
After the check, the gateway looks up the area that the requested door is assigned to and
determines whether the user has the access privilege on that area. If so then the gateway
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sends the request to the BAS.
The gateway communicates with the BAS in two ways. First, it accesses the BAS database
to check the access privileges of users and to record a log of recent requests. Standard SQL is
used by the gateway to communicate with the BAS database. Second, the gateway interfaces
with the Andover Continuum NetControllers to operate the BAS. It uses an OPC [23]
interface to communicate with the NetController. The gateway can control building objects
and read current states of those objects with the OPC interface. In our implementation, the
gateway sends the unlock command to doors and reads the current state of doors using the
OPC interface. Here, the current state of a door represents whether the door is opened or
closed.
In summary, the gateway veries the signature, checks the authentication time, examine
the policy constraints, and refers the BAS database for access rights. If the request pro-
ceeds without an error, the gateway nally issues the unlock command to the associated
NetController to unlock the door. Then it reads the state of the door and records relevant
information on the BAS database. Lastly, it sends a success message to the application




Here, we discuss a risk analysis of our system in providing interconnectivity to control
systems. In particular, we look into the dierent components of the architecture for possible
risks and consequences. In addition, we compare our strategy with other possible alternatives
that try to mitigate damage from malicious components or outside attacks.
6.1 Risk Analysis
Our system applies the multi-tier system to separate functionalities in providing the inter-
connectivity to the control system. Therefore, we introduce three new components to the
control system in providing the interconnectivity and supporting useful applications. Each
of the components could be a target for attack as well as the complex communication links
between them. However, because the multi-tier system compartmentalizes each component,
it could eectively contain faults or attacks to the targeted component. Additionally, the
multi-tier system makes the security-critical components to be partitioned easily.
The client program is usually as vulnerable as the machine that runs the program. If
the machine gets compromised, there is a high chance that the client program could also
be compromised. Computers are compromised in various ways. For example, people can
accidentally download viruses or malware on their machines or they could open and execute
an infected le. Attackers could exploit bugs of operating systems or applications to take the
control of the computers as well. Even though we expect that the users will have standard
precautions for viruses and malware, we do not rely on the users to keep their computers
safe. Consequently, we consider the client program not trustable. Our system limits the
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eect of the compromised client program by enforcing the principle of least privilege and the
gateway policy. The compromised client can only perform actions that are already allowed
to the client in the control system. Moreover, the gateway policy can enforce additional
policy that does not allow access to critical functions using our system although the user
actually has the right. Once the gateway nds out that the client program or the machine
is compromised, it should revoke the key it of the client. It can do it simply by deleting the
key and including the user ID in the black list.
The application server is highly vulnerable as well since it accepts connections from
various clients, presenting a large attack surface. Attacker can install the client program
and try to compromise the application server by exploiting the client program. As the
application server supports more applications, it will have more complex and larger code
base for those applications. This might provide a source for bugs and vulnerabilities that
could be used by attackers. Again, we expect that the application server will have general
protection mechanisms like rewalls, but some attacks like zero-day exploits are hard to
defend. Therefore, we do not trust the application server and limits the impact of the
compromised application server with the non-repudiable credential mechanism. Since the
compromised application server cannot acquire appropriate keys to sign fake requests, all it
can do is to use the signed requests that are within the expiration duration. As long as the
gateway proxy is secure, the actions of the compromised application server are very limited.
We assume that the gateway proxy is a trusted component. The reason for this is because
the gateway exports a limited, static interface only to the application server. We believe
that there is a rare chance of vulnerability in that narrow interface. However, it is highly
dangerous to the control system if it gets compromised because the gateway is the last line
of defense to the control system. If it gets compromised, accesses from outside to the control
system are not properly managed and could allow full access to attackers. Therefore, it
is important to thoroughly examine the interface for any bugs and vulnerabilities. Every
possible protective mechanism must be in place as well.
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6.2 Possible Alternative Approaches
Sandboxing is a common way to monitor and limit access of a component. It provides
limited interface to an untrusted component or program such that the untrusted component
or program can only access predened safe functions or data. It is designed to enforce
the principle of least privilege on the sandboxed component. Extensive use of sandboxing
appears in limiting system call interface to untrusted programs [4, 15, 14, 25] and in execution
environments like Java. The idea of sandboxing can also be applied to our system to enforce
the principle of least privilege on the application server. This can be done by providing
limited interface to the application server. This approach can limit the possible actions
of the compromised application server but not as much as our system. For example, the
compromised application server with sandboxing can send requests to open arbitrary doors,
whereas our system cannot do that due to the non-repudiable credential.
Another possibility is privilege separation [26] where an application is separated into two
components: a privileged part and an unprivileged part. Because of the separation, attacks
and damages on the unprivileged part is contained to itself, leaving the privileged part intact.
However, there are several disadvantages of this approach compared to our system. First,
every application must be separated into two parts, either manually or automatically [9].
As the number of application increases, more work needs to be done. Our system, on the
other hand, utilizes the multi-tier architecture to provide reusable interfaces and compo-
nents, making it easier to add new applications. Second, the separation must be conducted
wisely requiring knowledge about the application and some eorts. Simply placing entire
application in the privileged part will not give much security benet. Finally, the separation
might introduce more complexity to the application, leaving more attack surface. Sometimes
it is not clear how to separate an application into the privileged and the unprivileged part. If
the application requires a lot of complex communications between various components, and
if they are separated into dierent parts, it is not simple to provide a secure communication
between the two parts. If the communication becomes complex, there is a higher chance for
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a bug which could be used by attackers.
Intrusion detection system could also be used to protect the control system from outside
connections. It looks for anomalies in requests or suspicious access patterns and sends alerts
to the management system. For instance, it can consider many rejected requests from a single
client as suspicious and send an alert to the operator of the control system. However, the
intrusion detection system alone is not sucient to provide enough protection to the control
system. It is weak to zero-day attacks and is very hard to enforce policy constraints like our
system. For the intrusion detection system to enforce the principle of least privilege, it must
be able to gure out who has sent a request and decide whether that user has appropriate
access privilege. But we believe that the intrusion detection system can be incorporated into
our system to provide better protection. Audit records from the gateway could be used by




In this thesis, we introduced a new system which allows interconnectivity to the controls
systems from outside networks with a method to eectively mitigate risks to the control
system. In particular, we applied a multi-tier system to the control system and a way to
enforce the principle of least privilege on a higher-tier. In addition, our system requires
the non-repudiable credential with every access to the control system. These protective
mechanisms eectively restrict possible actions of malicious or compromised components on
the control system. Our system can also support a security policy separate from the existing
access control policy of the control system. With the secure interconnectivity provided
from our system, management of the control system becomes more convenient and ecient.
Moreover, the control system can now support various useful applications to help users of
the control system.
We have validated our system with an implementation on the building automation system
test bed. We presented a door unlock application which allows users to unlock doors without
physical keys or cards. Our system consists of three components: the client program, the
application server, and the gateway proxy. The client program provides a user interface to
send unlock requests to the control system. It utilizes digital signature scheme to provide the
non-repudiable credential to the gateway proxy. The application server acts as a web server,
accepting connections from clients and passing the signed requests to the gateway proxy.
The gateway proxy is a trusted component which enforces the principle of least privilege
on the application server as well as its own security policy. It checks various constraints
including signature verication and access rights. It directly communicates with the BAS.
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